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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Medical Recovery Services, LLC ("MRS"), appeals from the District Court's
Opinion and Order on Appeal dated February 26, 2015, affirming the Magistrate Court's Order
Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Granting Motion to Strike, and Denying Motion For
Attorney Fees entered on May 2, 2014. This appeal addresses the Magistrate Court's refusal to
award Supplemental Attorney's Fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(5) based upon the court's (1)
finding evidence where none exists; (2) implying unnecessary terms; and (3) reaching
conclusions that do not follow from the undisputed facts.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 14, 2012, the Magistrate Court entered a judgment for $4,973.46 consistent
with a stipulation between the parties that reads as follows:
1. That Defendants, ALLISON OLSEN and NATHAN OLSEN, wife and husband, hereby
admit and stipulate liability to plaintiff on the cause of action stated in the
Complaint; and

2. That Defendants, ALLISON OLSEN and NATHAN OLSEN, wife and husband, hereby
stipulate that a judgment may be entered against them in this cause in the sum of
$4,973.46, which judgment shall bear interest as provided by law until paid in full
and
3. That Plaintiff, Medical Recovery Services, LLC, hereby stipulates and agrees to
forebear on executing on the judgment providing the defendants make payments in
the amount of $100.00 each month between the 25th and 30th of each month
beginning in March, until the judgment is satisfied through monthly payments or
until the judgment is satisfied by other means. 1
The defendants, Nathan and Allison Olsen, ("the Olsens") failed to make even one of the
agreed upon payments; therefore, MRS initiated post-judgment proceedings to collect on the
judgment. These actions included multiple attempts at garnishment including serving a wage
1

R Vol. I, pp. LL. 61-62.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\Collections\MRS\Files\7341.0S660\Pleadings\1S1110 Appellate Brief.docx

Page 3 of 30

garnishment on Mr. Olsen's employer, Peterson, Moss, Hall & Olsen (where Mr. Olsen's
partner, Steve Hall, returned two garnishments unsatisfied claiming that Mr. Olsen was a
partner in the law firm and not an employee and that Mr. Olsen had no equity in the
partnership), and supplemental examinations of Mr. Olsen as well as multiple phone calls with
Mr. Olsen. 2
In February 2013, MRS served a subpoena duces tecum and deposition notice on Mr.
Hall, the managing partner of law firm where Mr. Olsen was employed. The purpose of the
deposition was to examine Mr. Hall with respect to various payroll documents, accounts
receivable documents, work in progress documents, etc. 3 On March 29, 2013, Bryan Smith,
counsel for MRS, spoke with Mr. Hall and agreed to vacate the deposition upon certain
conditions. Mr. Hall has submitted an affidavit identifying the terms of the agreement:
In March 2013, plaintiff sought to take my deposition in this matter. New
discussions resulted, in which plaintiff agreed to forego taking my deposition in
exchange for my promise to make two $250 payments regularly until the judgment had
been paid in full. I have substantially honored that agreement since that time, the first
payment having been made March 29, 2013, and the last payment having been made
yesterday, March 6, 2014.
In a subsequent affidavit, Mr. Hall admitted that the "new discussions" never included
any talk about fees. In explaining a conversation between himself and Mr. Smith after Mr. Hall
tendered the last payment with the notation "payment in full" in the memo, Mr. Hall states the
following:
Later that afternoon I received a call from Bryan Smith, who indicated that
because of the "payment in full" language he was going to be returning the check,
because the firm intended or might intend, to seek post-judgment attorney fees
incurred in collecting the judgment. I agreed that we had never discussed post-

2
3

R Vol. I, pp. 64-93.
R Vol. I, p. 93.
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judgment fees in our discussions, and he agreed that, even if he returned the check, we
had tendered payment. 4
As further evidence that the facts surrounding the agreement between Mr. Smith and
Mr. Hall are undisputed, the Olsens' counsel has submitted briefing to the court in which he has
stated:
In March 2013 counsel for the Olsens entered into discussions regarding
payment of the judgment, pursuant to which the Olsens through Petersen Moss
Hall & Olsen agreed to make regular twice monthly $250 payments until the
judgment had been paid in full, and plaintiff agreed to accept such payments, to
vacate a deposition of the undersigned, and not to engage in further collection
efforts as long as payments were timely made. There was no discussion about
supplemental fees either at the time the agreement to accept $250 per month
was made, or at any time thereafter before the judgment was paid in full. 5
The Magistrate Court denied MRS' motion for fees based upon the agreement made
between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall to vacate the deposition and make payments. The Magistrate
Court explained its reasoning as follows:
Well, my thoughts have ranged all over the place as I've thought about
this. You know, I've thought about some of the movies that my kids watch with
the Sheriff of Nottingham and Robin Hood and so forth, and those aren't
appropriate to discuss, so I won't go into those. 6

***
What I see here -first of all, as a matter of course, I think there's no
question that 12-120(5) does grant additional attorney's fees for efforts to
collect on a judgment. There's no question about that.
There's also the principle of written agreements, and that those written
agreements are binding about the parties. And, generally speaking, they can't be
set aside by oral modifications later. However, when someone acts in reliance
upon an agreement, or an oral contract, I think that they can expect to receive
the benefit that they derive from that bargain.

4

R Vol. I, p. 100.
R Vol. I, pp. 152-153.
6 TR Vol. I, p. 24 LL. 3-8.
5
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The problem with the supplemental fees the way that Mr. Zollinger's presenting
them is it's a revolving door that never ends. That always -there are always going to be
forever attorney's fees incurred in these cases, and a person could never actually satisfy
the judgment if I accept Mr. Zollinger's approach to this case.
So in my case - and I think this is really based more in terms of equity than
anything else that I can articulate well, except for that there is the concept of contract
law. And it appears to me that there was a contract reached between Mr. Peterson and
Mr. Zollinger, and there were some issues with that, and they took some efforts to
change that, but then they entered into negotiations through Mr. Hall, and there was an
agreement reached how to satisfy that judgment.
Then upon reaching that oral agreement, they acted in reliance upon that
contract and made those payments based on that without any assertion that there
would be additional attorney's fees at the end. And I think that's a contract that should
be given weight, or at least that the plaintiff in this case should be estopped from
seeking additional attorney's fees because they allowed them to continue to do that.
If, in fact, Mr. Zollinger was going to ask for additional attorney's fees, the time
to have done that would have been at the time of making of that oral agreement,
saying, "Hey, we recognize that there hasn't been a payment here. There's some
additional costs we've incurred. If you pay this amount, a new amount then we'll
consider that a satisfaction of judgment."
But it appears based on the facts, that that wasn't the discussion. It was just,
"This is how much we're going to pay until this sum, the original judgment, is paid in
full." And so I'm going to - I'm going to hold the parties to that based on the
defendant's reliance upon that. 7
The Magistrate Court entered its order denying fees on April 1, 2014. 8 MRS then filed a
motion for reconsideration. 9 The Magistrate Court denied the motion for reconsideration
reasoning as follows:
My understanding of the facts is there was a debt that was outstanding, and
there were some legal proceedings in an attempt to collect on that debt. There was a
conversation between the two firms in an effort to satisfy that debt, and to eliminate or to remove the necessity for ongoing legal proceedings.

7
8
9

TR Vol. I, p. 24, L. 21 - p. 26, L. 18.
R Vol. I, pp. 124-125.
R Vol. I, p. 129.
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I think that's the key to the Court's - I think the part of that that I want to
rearticulate to make sure it's clear on the record, is that the agreement in this case was
for the satisfaction of a debt. There was an agreement that if Hall and his firm paid a
certain amount, and paid off the debt, that would satisfy the debt and resolve the
issues.
To then come back and allow for supplemental attorney's fees means that a
debtor has to shoot at a moving target. What - and I certainly would agree that if there
were additional legal procedures that were necessary after the agreement was made for
the satisfaction of the debt, that that's something that I think would be different
because there would be - presumably there would be some breach of the agreement
that necessitated those additional fees.
However, at the time the agreement was made for the satisfaction of the debt,
everything was known to Medical Recovery Services, and they agreed to allow payments
to satisfy the then existing judgment as satisfaction of the debt.
Based on that, I will, again, deny- Well, I'll simply deny the motion for
reconsideration and reaffirm the decision the Court previously made in this matter
regarding that issue. 10
MRS filed an appeal 11, and the District Court affirmed the decision of the Magistrate
Court in a written decision dated February 26, 2015. 12 MRS timely filed this appeal on March

18, 2015. 13
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On February 3, 2011, MRS filed the Complaint 14 and subsequently served the Olsens. 15
MRS subsequently filed two Notices of Intent To Take Default. 16 On September 9, 2011, the
Olsens filed an Answer prose .17

10

TR Vol. I, p.
R Vol. I. pp.
12 R Vol. I, pp.
13 R Vol. I. pp.
14 R Vol. I, pp.
15 R Vol. I, pp.
16 R Vol. I, pp.
17 R Vol. I, pp.
11

38, L. 6 - p.39, L. 11.
166-168.
206-216.
218-220.
9-10.
51-52.
15-18.
21-23.
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On October 12, 2011, MRS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting
documents. 18 On March 14, 2012, the Magistrate Court entered judgment based on a
Stipulation for Judgment between the parties. 19 The Olsens failed to make their first payment
under the Stipulation for Judgment. 20 Accordingly, MRS took the following steps to enforce the
judgment:
*On April 9, 2012, MRS filed an Affidavit in Support of Writ of Execution and obtained a
writ of execution and notice of garnishment directed to Nathan Olsen's bank; 21
*On April 12, 2012, MRS directed the Bonneville County Sherriff to serve the bank
garnishment on Wells Fargo that was returned unsatisfied; 22
*On April 26, MRS applied for an Order of Continuing Garnishment and caused a writ of
execution to be served on Mr. Olsen's law firm; 23
*On May 3, 2012, Stephen Hall returned the garnishment unsatisfied, stating that the
"defendant is a partner in the firm, not an employee"; 24
*On June 8, 2012, MRS filed and obtained another writ of execution and again had the
same served on Mr. Olsen's law firm; 25
*On June 8, 2012, MRS filed for an Order of Examination that was scheduled for July 13,

2012; 26
*On June 15, 2012, Stephen Hall returns the third garnishment unsatisfied stating that
"as a partner, Nathan Olsen has equity in the partnership" and "at this point, the
•
•
II 27
equrty 1s zero ;
*On August 27, 2012, MRS filed and obtained yet another Order of Examination, this
one scheduled for September 28, 2012; 28 and
18

R Vol.
R Vol.
20 R Vol.
21 R Vol.
22 R Vol.
23 R Vol.
24 R Vol.
25 R Vol.
26 R Vol.
27 R Vol.
28 R Vol.
19

I, pp. 25-49.
I, pp. 60-63.
I, p. 61.
I, pp. 64-71.
I, pp. 64-71.
I, pp. 72-78.
I, p. 75.
I, pp. 79-85.
I, p. 83.
I, p. 85.
I, p. 89.
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*On February 13, 2013, MRS sent a Subpoena Duces Tecum for service on Stephen Hall
and the subpoena was served on March 2, 2013. 29
In March 2013, Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall spoke agreeing to vacate Mr. Hall's deposition
provided Mr. Hall make two $250 payments per month until the judgment had been paid in
full. 30 Mr. Hall made all the payments pursuant to the oral agreement making the last payment
on March 6, 2014. 31 This last payment included the notation "payment in full" on the check
and that Mr. Smith returned because MRS intended to seek fees. 32
On March 7, 2014, the Olsens filed a Motion to Compel Judgment Creditor to Record
Satisfaction of Judgment and Affidavit of Stephen D. Hall in support of that motion. 33 MRS then
filed an Application for Award of Supplemental Attorney's Fees with supporting documents. 34
The Magistrate Court held the hearing on the motions on April 1, 2014, and signed an Order
Denying Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees and Compelling Plaintiff to Record Satisfaction
of Judgment. 35
MRS recorded a Satisfaction of Judgment on April 7, 2014 and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration along with supporting documents on April 14, 2014. 36 On April 18, 2014, the
Olsens filed Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees. 37 On May 2, 2014, the Magistrate Court

29

R Vol. I, pp. 93-95.

30

R Vol. I, p. 99.
R Vol. I, p. 99.

31

32

R Vol.
R Vol.
34 R Vol.
35 R Vol.
36 R Vol.
37 R Vol.
33

I,
I,
I,
I,
I,
I,

pp 99-100.
pp. 96-101.
pp. 105-116.
p. 123.
pp. 127-142.
pp 145-46.
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held a hearing on these motions and denied both MRS' Motion for Reconsideration and
Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees. 38
On June 3, 2014, MRS filed a Notice of Appeal to the District Court. 39 On February 26,
2015, the District Court entered its Opinion and Order on Appeal 40 affirming the Magistrate
Court's findings and conclusions. 41 On March 24, 2015, MRS filed a Notice of Appeal with this
Court. 42

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
IS THIS COURT PROCEDURALLY BOUND TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT

1.

COURT'S DENYING MRS ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 12-120(5) WHERE THE
MAGISTRATE COURT FOUND EVIDENCE THAT DOES NOT EXIST, IMPLIED UNNECESSARY
TERMS, AND REACHED CONCLUSIONS THAT DO NOT FOLLOW FROM THE UNDISPUTED
FACTS?

2.

IS MRS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL UNDER

I.C. §§ 12-120(1), (3) AND (5) AND I.A.R. 40 AND 41?
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT MUST REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
BECAUSE THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND ITS CONCLUSIONS
DO NOT FOLLOW FROM THE UNDISPUTED FACTS.
A.

Standard of Review.
This Court has held that the standard of review is as follows when this Court reviews the

decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate court:

38
39
40

41
42

R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.
R Vol.

I,
I,
I,
I,
I,

pp. 163-65.
pp. 166-68.
pp. 206-17.
p. 214.
pp. 218-20.
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The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law
follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the
conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's
decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Bailey
v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526 (2012) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672
(2008)). Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court.
Id. "Rather, we are 'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the
district court.' " Id. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n. 1 (2009)).
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59 (2013).

Interpreting an unambiguous contract is an issue of law subject to free review.
Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605-06 (2002). Whether a contract is

ambiguous is also a question of law. Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, L.L.C., 141 Idaho 185,
190 (2005) (quotation omitted).
Here, this Court is procedurally bound to reverse the decision of the District Court
because the Magistrate Court's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence and
its conclusions of law do not follow from the undisputed facts. Moreover, this Court can
further exercise free review of the Magistrate Court's conclusions because the case involves
interpreting an unambiguous contract.

B.

MRS Is Entitled To Seek An Award Of Reasonable Attorney Fees For Its Necessary Efforts
To Collect On The Judgment.
Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) provides:
In all instances where a party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and
costs under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this section, such party shall also be
entitled to reasonable post judgment attorney's fees and costs incurred in
attempting to collect on the judgment. Such attorney's fees and costs shall be
set by the court following the filing of a memorandum of attorney's fees and
costs with notice to all parties and hearing.

I.C. § 12-120(5) (emphasis added).
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\Collections\MRS\Files\7341.05660\Pleadings\151110 Appellate Brief.docx

Page 11 of 30

This section provides a basis for an award of fees and costs incurred during postjudgment attempts to collect on the judgment if the party was entitled to fees and costs under
the statute in the underlying proceeding that resulted in the judgment. Action Collection
Servs., Inc., v. Bingham, 146 Idaho 286 (Ct. App. 2008). Here, it is not disputed that MRS is
entitled to seek fees and costs incurred in its attempts to collect on the judgment against the
Olsens unless MRS agreed not to seek such fees or otherwise waived its right to seek such fees.
C.

The Oral Contract Between Counsel For The Olsens And MRS Did Not Prevent MRS
From Seeking Fees.
'"The determination and legal effect of a contractual provision is a question of law.

111

Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69 (2007) (quoting Maroun v Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604
(2005)). This Court's '"primary objective when interpreting a contract is to discover the mutual
intent of the parties at the time the contract is made."' Id. (quoting Opportunity, L.L.C. v.
Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 607 (2002)). "If possible, the intent of the parties should be
ascertained from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their intent." Id.
Here, the facts surrounding the agreement and the agreement itself are undisputed.
After MRS had unsuccessfully attempted-twice-to garnish Mr. Olsen's wages at his law firm,
MRS served a deposition subpoena duces tecum on the managing partner, Mr. Hall, for him to
testify about Mr. Olsen's accounts receivables, work in progress, billings, etc. Mr. Hall called
Mr. Smith, and they agreed that MRS would forego taking Mr. Hall's deposition in exchange for
Mr. Hall's promise to make two $250 payments regularly until the judgment was paid in full.
The facts are further undisputed that Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall never discussed post-judgment
fees in their discussions making the oral contract silent on the issues offees. And nothing

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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indicates that the silence manifested an intent that MRS would forego the opportunity to
pursue an award of fees.
Given that MRS had a statutory right to seek fees, the Olsens essentially argue that the
oral agreement between MRS and the Olsens resulted in MRS' waiving its right to seek fees.
But there was no actual waiver in this case. A waiver is a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808
(1993); and Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709 (2014). "[T]he
party proving waiver is required to show a clear intent to waive." Id. at p. 719. Here, there is
no evidence that MRS voluntarily gave up its right to seek fees let alone evidence of a "clear
intent" to give up its right.
case are very

to

in

V.

a

to

to
was no

matter to
court

costs.

Mr.

Just as in

In

not

any

was

on

on
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an

matter to

an

costs to MRS.

This Court also has held that one party's subjective undisclosed intent to modify a
written contract is not sufficient evidence of the parties' mutual intent to modify an agreement,
especially where the modification results in a waiver of the other party's rights.
In Pocatello Hospital, this Court addressed the issue of a lease modification. Counsel for
one party testified that he left out a certain provision in an Estoppel Certificate that was
contained in a previous written lease agreement. Counsel testified that he left out the
provision because he wanted "to confirm that the parties had waived the right to adjustments
through their course of conduct." Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 156
Idaho 709, 718 (2014). The facts were undisputed that "the subject of the rent adjustment was

never discussed by the parties." Id. (emphasis added). This Court held that counsel's
"unilateral intent to modify the terms ofthe Lease was insufficient to support" his client's
position that the other party waived the provision. Id. The Court reasoned as follows:
We are in particular agreement with the district court's observation that
"removing language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing
the same or making the other party aware of its deletion does not establish
mutual assent.' In fact, some might question the propriety of such conduct."
The district court did not err in finding that Faulkner's subjective, undisclosed
intent to modify the rent adjustment provision of the Lease by deleting language
found in the 1996 Esto pp el Certificate was not sufficient evidence of the parties'
mutual intent to modify the Lease.
1

Id.
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Here, the evidence is undisputed that the Olsens had entered into a written stipulation
to judgment in which the Olsens would make payments on the judgment. The stipulation does
not address the issue of fees. In a telephone conversation subsequent to the written
stipulation that the Olsens failed to honor, Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith entered into an oral
modification of the written stipulated agreement and again never discussed the issue of fees.
From these undisputed facts, the Magistrate Court concluded that one of the terms of the
agreement was that upon satisfaction of the agreement "the debt" (including a claim for fees)
would be satisfied and the dispute between MRS and the Olsens would be resolved. The
Magistrate Court concluded that the Olsens acted in reliance on this "term" of the agreement.
But under Pocatello Hospital, Mr. Hall and the Olsens could not reasonably act in
reliance upon the term that MRS would not seek fees because (1) MRS is legally entitled to
recover fees; and (2) just like in Pocatello Hospital, the issue (fees) was never discussed
between Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith and therefore never waived by MRS. The Magistrate Court
could not conclude that the parties mutually intended to modify the written stipulation to
prevent MRS from seeking fees where Mr. Smith and MRS never knew that Mr. Hall and the
Olsens harbored a subjective undisclosed intent on this issue that none of the parties ever
raised during the telephone conversation.

D.

1.

Facts Are

Mr. Hall has correctly summarized the entire oral agreement between him and Mr.
Smith stating that the Olsens "agreed to make regular twice monthly $250 payments until the
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judgment had been paid in full, and plaintiff agreed to accept such payments, to vacate a
deposition of the undersigned [Mr. Hall], and not to engage in further collection efforts as long
as payments were timely made. There was no discussion about supplemental fees either at the
time the agreement to accept $250 per month was made, or at any time thereafter before the
judgment was paid in full." 43

2.

At The Original Hearing On The Motion For Fees The Magistrate Court Wrongly
Concluded That The Olsens Reasonably Relied On MRS' Silence Believing That
MRS Would Not Seek Fees.

At the original hearing on the motion for fees, the Magistrate Court stated that the
Olsens had agreed to make monthly payments without MRS disclosing that it would seek fees
at the end. The Magistrate Court concluded that MRS should be estopped from seeking
additional fees finding that MRS' silence "allowed" the Olsens to believe that by making the
payments for the full amount of the original judgment there would not be any additional fees,
and the Olsens relied on that silence in entering the agreement. The Magistrate Court said that
MRS should have told the Olsens MRS considered a "new amount" was required for satisfaction
of the judgment. This "new amount" comprised the original judgment plus post-judgment
collection fees and costs. According to the Magistrate Court, the time for MRS to raise the issue
of fees was at the time of the agreement. By not doing so, MRS created a problem for the
Olsens because MRS' nondisclosure of its intent to seek fees created "a revolving door that
never ends" 44 because "there are always going to be forever attorney's fees incurred in these

43
44

R Vol. I, pp. 152-153.
R Vol. I, p. 25, LL. 8-9.
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cases, and a person could never actually satisfy the judgment" 45 if the court were to accept
MRS' approach.
But the Olsens were presumed to know the law that MRS was entitled to seek fees. See
U.S. v. Morse, 218 U.S. 493, 510 (1910) ("Everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorance,

standing alone, can never be the basis of a legal right"). It is unreasonable to conclude that
mere silence "allowed" the Olsens to believe that MRS was waiving its right to seek fees
because waiver requires the intentional relinquishment of a known right. And no substantial
evidence exists to support such a finding by the Magistrate Court.
Moreover, the undisputed facts do not give rise to a waiver especially where neither Mr.
Hall nor Mr. Smith ever discussed the issue of fees, nor did mere silence give the Olsens any
indication from the facts that MRS would not pursue its right to seek fees. In fact, the only
reasonable conclusion is that by not discussing the issue of fees Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith left the
discussions believing that the status quo continued to exist. The status quo meant that MRS
still had the right to seek fees. In his own mind, Mr. Hall may have relied on the silence
regarding the fees issue, but given that he and Mr. Smith never discussed the issue, and given
that MRS had a clear legal right to seek fees, Mr. Hall's reliance was unreasonable and could
more accurately be described as "hope."
The Magistrate Court further reached the wrong conclusion from the undisputed facts
because going into the discussions between Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall, MRS had the right to seek
fees, and Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall discussed nothing that resulted in MRS' forfeiting that right. In
other words, under Idaho law, MRS was entitled to seek fees. No discussions between Mr.

45

R Vol. I, p. 25, LL. 9-12.
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Smith and Mr. Hall can reasonably be construed to mean that MRS waived, abandoned, or
contractually or otherwise, MRS' right to seek fees. This means that coming out of
the discussions MRS retained the right to seek fees.
Under Idaho law, MRS cannot consider a judgment satisfied only when a judgment
debtor pays the original judgment plus post-judgment collection fees and costs especially when
a court has not identified these in any award reduced to an amended judgment. In fact, MRS
would be misrepresenting the law to tell a judgment debtor, as the Magistrate Court required,
"There's some additional costs we've incurred. If you pay this amount, a new amount then
we'll consider that a satisfaction of judgment."46 The Magistrate Court's required disclosure is
contrary to law. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 58(b) states that "[u]pon full payment of a
judgment, the party in whose favor the judgment was rendered shall have the duty to record a
satisfaction in every county where the judgment or abstract of the judgment is recorded and to
file it in the court of entry." Under Rule 58(b), MRS must consider a judgment "satisfied" when
it is paid in full, not when it is paid in full and the judgment debtor pays post-judgment
collection fees and costs that the court has not reduced to an award or amended judgment.
The Magistrate Court further wrongly concluded that the time for MRS to raise the issue
of fees was at the time of the agreement. Idaho Code§ 12-120(5) provides a right to seek
reasonable post-judgment attorney's fees incurred in attempting to collect on a judgment. This
code section says that "[s]uch attorney's fees and costs shall be set by the court following the
filing of a memorandum of attorney's fees and costs with notice to all parties and hearing." The
Magistrate Court essentially changed Idaho law from allowing MRS to raise fees with the court

46
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after notice following the filing of a memorandum of attorney's fees to requiring MRS to raise
whenever setting up payments on a judgment in which MRS may or will seek fees for postjudgment collection work.
Finally, the Magistrate Court wrongly concluded that MRS had created 11 a revolving door
that never ends" 47 because "there are always going to be forever attorney's fees incurred in
these cases, and a person could never actually satisfy the judgment." 48 This statement is wrong
because the Olsens could have avoided the prospect of fees by simply paying the judgment
before MRS incurred any post-judgment collection fees or by setting up a payment plan that
addressed the issue if the Olsens had complied with the terms of the payment plan. It is simply
not true that "there are always going to be forever attorney's fees incurred" and that "a person
could never satisfy a judgment" unless the creditor is required to "negotiate" its right to seek
fees when discussing payment of a judgment.

3.

At The Hearing On Motion For Reconsideration The Magistrate Court Expanded
The Agreement Beyond The Undisputed Facts To Preclude Fees For MRS.

At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the Magistrate Court again made
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence and drew additional conclusions
that do not follow from the undisputed facts. The Magistrate Court made a finding that if Mr.
Hall and his firm paid a certain amount, then that would satisfy "the debt and resolve the
issues." 49 In reality, the agreement was for stopping garnishment efforts, particularly Mr. Hall's
deposition, in exchange for payments from Mr. Hall until the original judgment was paid in full.
There is no factual record to support any finding that payments would satisfy "the debt and

47

TR Vol. I, p. 25, LL. 8-9.
TR Vol. I, p. 25, LL. 9-12.
49 TR Vol. I, p. 38 LL. 17-18.
48
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resolve the issues." Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith never used any language even remotely similar to
"the debt and resolve the issues."
The Magistrate Court's faulty finding is significant because by making a finding that
morphed satisfaction of the original "judgment" into satisfaction of "the debt and resolving the
issues," the Magistrate Court effectively and unreasonably expanded the agreement by treating
the agreed upon payments as resolving all liability for the Olsens, including both the original
judgment and any fees the court might award.
The Magistrate Court's finding expanding the agreement is further not supported by
substantial evidence because Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall never discussed paying off "the debt" or
"resolving the issues" but discussed only paying off the original "judgment." This is especially
true given that Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall never even discussed fees or the effect of paying the
judgment in full. Thus, the Magistrate Court cannot conclude that the agreed upon payments
somehow deprived MRS of its right to seek fees.
Finally, at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the Magistrate Court
continued its faulty rationale that to allow fees "means that a debtor has to shoot at a moving
target." 50 The Magistrate Court's conclusion does not follow because the Olsens could have
paid the judgment in full before MRS incurred any post-judgment collection fees, or the Olsens
could have specifically raised the issue of fees in connection with a settlement.

4.

The Magistrate Court Cannot Imply A Term Preventing MRS From Seeking
Supplemental Fees On These Undisputed Facts.

"Courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them
more equitable." Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41-42, (2003). When a
50
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contract is clear and unambiguous, courts are required to enforce the terms as written and
cannot revise them in order to make it better for the parties. McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of
Control, 141 Idaho 463 (2005). Terms that are not made part of a contract can be implied only

when they are a necessary term:
Terms are to be implied in a contract, not because they are reasonable,
but because they are necessarily involved in the contractual relationship so that

the parties must have intended them and have only failed to express them
because of sheer inadvertence or because they are too obvious to need
expression.
Star Phoenix Min. Co. v. Hecla Min. Co., 130 Idaho 223, 231 (1997) (emphasis added).

Here, the Magistrate Court appears to have concluded that implied in the terms of the
agreement was that upon satisfaction of the agreement "the debt" (including a claim for fees)
would be satisfied and the dispute between MRS and the Olsens would be resolved. But this
"implied term" is not necessary to the contractual relationship in which Mr. Smith agreed to
forego collection efforts, including Mr. Hall's deposition, in exchange for Mr. Hall's promise to
make two payments per month for $250 each until the original judgment was paid in full. And
the issue of fees was not necessary to give each of the parties what they bargained for:
Payments for MRS on the judgment until paid in full, and stopping Mr. Hall's obligation to sit for
deposition. MRS obviously did not intend this "implied term" given that MRS sought an award
of fees, and no facts exist to conclude that the parties failed to express the "implied term" due
to "sheer inadvertence" or because the issue was "too obvious to need expression."
The Magistrate Court improperly implied terms into the agreement of the parties
obviously in an effort to make the agreement "more equitable" in the Magistrate
Court's mind. This is borne out by the Magistrate Court's on the record statement that
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approach is "really based more in terms of equity than anything else that I can
articulate." 51 The Magistrate Court carried the equity theme further saying, "Well, my
thoughts have ranged all over the place as rve thought about this. You know, I've
thought about some of the movies that my kids watch with the Sheriff of Nottingham
and Robin Hood and so forth, and those aren't appropriate to discuss, so I won't go into
those." 52
But the Magistrate Court does not possess the roving power to rewrite the agreement
to make it "equitable" for the Olsens according to the Magistrate Court's sense of justice. It is
well established in Idaho that a court
icate

not use

or

to

sense
V.

&

Inc., 141 Idaho

716, 720 (2005) (citing Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 387 (Ct.App.1986)). Here,
the Magistrate Court appears to have used power it does not have to rewrite a better
agreement for the Olsens to vindicate the Magistrate Court's own sense of justice believing that
MRS' seeking post-judgment collection fees is akin to stealing from the poor to give to the rich.
E.

The District Court's Conclusions Do Not Follow From The Undisputed Facts And Are
Based On The Magistrate Court's Findings Not Supported By Substantial Evidence.
In addition to drawing many of the same faulty conclusions as the Magistrate Court, the

District Court accepted the Magistrate Court's faulty findings and drew its own conclusions that
likewise do not follow from the undisputed facts. The District Court stated the following:
Judge Walker made a ruling that the agreement between Mr. Hall and
Mr. Smith was made on the understanding that after the debt was paid off, the
51
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52
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judgment would be satisfied. Accordingly, the supplemental work performed by
MRS's attorneys prior to the agreement with Mr. Hall, and the associated fees,
must have been included in the debt because the judgment would not have been
satisfied with outstanding post-judgment attorney's fees. This Court finds that
Judge Walker's rationale was reasonable. 53
First, as explained previously in this Brief, no substantial evidence supports the finding
that Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith discussed paying off uthe debt." Instead, the undisputed facts
show they agreed that the payments would pay off "the judgment." Again, this is significant
because uthe debt," as interpreted by the Magistrate Court, means all liabilities, including fees,
whereas "the judgment" is limited and excludes all liabilities, including fees. Second, no
substantial evidence supports the finding that Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall discussed that the
judgment would be [{satisfied" once it was paid in full. Third, the District Court wrongfully
concluded that payment in full on a judgment or "satisfaction" of the original judgment
precludes an award of fees. This Court has said that attorney's fees are a collateral issue which
does not go to the merits of an action and that a court retains jurisdiction to make an award
even after a suit has been terminated. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69 (2007) (citing Inland

Group of Cos., Inc. v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho 473 (1998)). 54
In affirming the Magistrate Court's ruling, the District Court stated that [{Mr. Hall's
assumption that all of the debt owed to MRS in April of 2014, including any debt owed for work
performed to collect on the debt, was included in the agreement between Mr. Hall and Mr.

53

R Vol. I, p. 209.
When a judgment debtor pays a judgment amount in full, the judgment creditor must record a satisfaction of
judgment under I.R.C.P. 58(b). The judgment creditor can then seek post-judgment collection fees under I.C. 12120(5) and obtain an "amended judgment." Once the judgment debtor pays this "amended judgment" in full, the
judgment creditor then must record a satisfaction for this "amended judgment." This is the procedure
contemplated under Idaho law. This case has brought to the forefront the "practice" by nearly all Southeast Idaho
courts that they will not allow a party to seek post-judgment fees and costs if the judgment creditor first records a
satisfaction of the original judgment and then seeks fees.
54
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Smith was a reasonable and valid assumption." 55 Again, no substantial evidence exists that Mr.
made this assumption nor can this be a reasonable finding given the undisputed facts. It
does not follow from the undisputed facts because all Mr. Smith and Mr. Hall discussed was
payments on the original judgment, not "the debt," and they did not discuss fees or "any debt
owed for work performed to collect on the debt."
The District Court reasoned that "[w]hen making an agreement to settle a debt, most
debtors would likely assume that all the money including past attorney's fees, owed to the
creditor is included in the agreement." 56 The District Court's conclusion is irrelevant and does
not follow because "[e]veryone is presumed to know the law. Ignorance, standing alone, can
never be the basis of a legal right." U.S. v. Morse, 218 U.S. 493,510 (1910). The District Court's
reasoning is especially flawed here where Mr. Hall and Mr. Olsen are both attorneys who are
presumed to know that MRS has a right to seek fees for post-judgment collection work, and
who both knew that MRS had engaged in substantial post-judgment collection work.
The District Court further concluded that "creditors have an advantage when
negotiating new debt agreements because they know the entire debt amount including
attorney's fees and other fees expended to collect on the debt. Debtors, on the other hand,
only know the amount of the original debt and must rely on the creditor to provide valid and
accurate information for any other fees." 57 But the District Court's conclusions do not follow.
Specifically, a judgment debtor agreeing to make payments on a judgment knows the
amount of the judgment just like the judgment creditor knows the amount of the judgment.

55
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57 R Vol. I, pp. 213-214.
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The District Court does not appear to like the fact that a judgment debtor may not know that a
judgment creditor has a right to seek post-judgment collection fees. But this is not an
"advantage 11 in negotiating payment terms on a judgment because any award of such fees or
costs is collateral to the judgment. Moreover, it can always be said that individuals who know
the law have an "advantage" over those who do not know the law.
Any "advantage" a judgment creditor may have disappears if the judgment debtor
simply were to ask if the judgment creditor has incurred any post-judgment collection fees and
costs, what these are, and whether the judgment creditor intended to seek them. Obviously, in
this circumstance, the judgment debtor should be able to rely on the judgment creditor to
provide valid and accurate information. But instead of requiring the judgment debtor to simply
ask for the information, the District Court has created new law by imposing a duty to disclose
on the judgment creditor because the District Court is concerned that the judgment creditor
knows the law regarding post-judgment collection fees and the judgment debtor does not.
In this case, both Mr. Hall and Mr. Olsen are licensed attorneys who knew that MRS had
performed the following post-judgment collection work:
*On April 9, 2012, MRS filed an Affidavit in Support of Writ of Execution and obtained a
writ of execution and notice of garnishment directed to Nathan Olsen's bank; 58
*On April 12, 2012, MRS directed the Bonneville County Sherriff to serve a bank
garnishment on Wells Fargo that was returned unsatisfied; 59
*On April 26, MRS applied for an Order of Continuing Garnishment and caused a writ of
execution to be served on Mr. Olsen's law firm; 60

58
59
60
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*On May 3, 2012, Stephen Hall returned the garnishment unsatisfied, stating that the
"defendant is a partner in the firm, not an employee;" 61
*On June 8, 2012, MRS filed and obtained another writ of execution and again had the
same served on Mr. Olsen's law firm; 62
*On June 8, 2012, MRS filed for an Order of Examination that was scheduled for July 13,
2012·I 63
*On June 15, 2012, Stephen Hall returns the third garnishment unsatisfied stating that
"as a partner, Nathan Olsen has equity in the partnership" and "at this point, the
equity is zero"; 64
*On August 27, 2012, MRS filed and obtained yet another Order of Examination, this
one scheduled for September 28, 2012; 65 and
*On February 13, 2013, MRS sent a Subpoena Duces Tecum for service on Stephen Hall
and the subpoena was served on March 2, 2013. 66
Mr. Hall and Mr. Olsen knew MRS had performed this post-judgment collection work
and incurred fees and costs for such post-judgment collection work. Only the amount a court
would award remained undetermined. All Mr. Hall or Mr. Olsen had to do was ask MRS to
quantify the fees for this work. Instead, the Olsens have sought to take advantage of their
failure to raise the issue and their "reliance" on their own unilateral undisclosed intent. Just
like it did in Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, supra, for similar conduct,
this Court should "question the propriety of such conduct."

61
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62

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\Collections\MRS\Files\7341.05660\Pleadings\151110 Appellate Brief.docx

Page 26 of 30

F.

The District And Magistrate Court's Conclusions Create A Duty To Speak Where None
Exists Under Idaho Law.
Both the Magistrate and District Courts imposed a duty on judgment creditors to

disclose to judgment debtors (even when they are represented by an attorney--like this case-and even when the judgment debtor is an attorney--like this case) the judgment creditor's
intent to seek fees and costs when setting up payments on a judgment. Neither the Magistrate
nor the District Court cited any law in Idaho or anywhere for imposition of such a duty.
In Idaho, a duty of disclosure generally occurs only in connection with fraudulent
nondisclosure and even then only under certain limited circumstances. Printcraft Press, Inc. v.
Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440 (2012). But in each of these circumstances, every

person owed the duty of disclosure must reasonably rely on the nondisclosed fact and must
have no knowledge of the fact to be disclosed. Id. But again, "[e]veryone is presumed to know
the law. Ignorance, standing alone, can never be the basis of a legal right." U.S. v. Morse, 218
U.S. 493, 510 (1910). Because Mr. Hall and the Olsens are presumed to know that MRS had a
right to seek fees under Idaho law, the Olsens could not reasonably rely on the nondisclosed
fact that MRS could seek fees. Therefore, MRS could not have any duty to disclose this to the
Olsens.
To place a duty on an attorney for a judgment creditor to tell another attorney (Mr. Hall
here) how the attorney for the judgment creditor intends to represent his client would require
the attorney for the judgment creditor to violate his ethical duty to his own client because
disclosing a client's strategy is likely against the best interest of his client and likely helps the
interests of the other side. An attorney cannot zealously represent his client when he is under
a duty to reveal his strategy for making his client "whole." In a sense, the disclosure rule the
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Magistrate Court created is like requiring the pitcher to tell the batter what pitch he intends to
throw or having the quarterback tell the defense what play his team intends to run.
G.

The District And Magistrate Court's Conclusions Invade The Attorney Work-Product
Doctrine.
Under the attorney work-product doctrine, mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or

legal theories of an attorney of a party concerning litigation are absolutely privileged from
disclosure. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).
Here, both the Magistrate and District Courts have imposed a duty on counsel for a judgment
creditor to notify a judgment debtor of its litigation strategy to seek post-judgment collection
fees before applying for those fees if the judgment creditor sets up a payment plan on the
judgment. This new duty violates the absolute privilege of the attorney work-product doctrine
because it requires the attorney to disclose his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or
legal theories concerning how he intends to litigate a case and his client's rights under Idaho
law. No attorney can be required to disclose his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories because they are absolutely protected from disclosure by the attorney workproduct doctrine. Yet, the new duty created by the Magistrate Court does exactly this.

II.
MRS IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ITS COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL.
Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules permits the award of costs to the prevailing party
on appeal. Rule 40 states, "Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party
unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." As the prevailing party on appeal,
MRS is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Rule 40. Similarly, Rule 41 provides for an
award of attorney's fees. A prevailing party on appeal is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal if
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that prevailing party was entitled to attorney's fees before the lower court. Action Collection
Servs., Inc., v. Bingham, 146 Idaho 286 (Ct. App. 2008).

Here, MRS is entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(5) for its postjudgment attorney's fees incurred in attempting to collect on the judgment. Moreover, a court
may award reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection with the effort to secure a
reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-8 Engineers, Inc. 149 Idaho
294 (2010). Accordingly, MRS is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees on appeal to
this Court and before the District Court.

CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in this brief, MRS respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the decision of the District Court and remand the matter to

an

Court

costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(5). This Court should also

award MRS its fees and costs on appeal before the District Court and this Court.

SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
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